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Zakarin: AIDS Phobia

SCARED TO DEATH: A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
AIDS PHOBIA
INTRODUCTION

According to a 1987 New York imes poll, 1 Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is the most feared disease in the
United States, except for cancer. 2 AIDS is caused by the Human
Immuno-deficiency Virus (HiV), 3 which can be transmitted in
various ways. 4 Medical studies have shown that a majority of
1. Ronald Sullivan, AIDS Overtakes Disease of Heart as No. 2 Wony,
N.Y. TamES, Mar. 25, 1987, at B4 (stating that a telephone survey of 1,000
randomly selected Americans ranked AIDS as the second most serious health
problem and cancer as the most serious health problem).
2. Id. Other polls around the country have resulted in similar findings.
See Bill Soiffer, Perspective on Health, Surviving Cancer, but not Stigma,
L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1991, at M5 (stating that polls consistently rank cancer
as the nation's most feared disease); Robert Steinbrook, The Times Poll; AIDS
Threat Changes Lifestyle of 1 in 5, L.A. TIMES, July 30, 1987, at 1 (stating
that cancer still remains the nation's most feared disease). But cf. Associated
Press, Fear ofAIDS Rivals Worry Over Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1987,
at C3 (national telephone survey revealed that 44% of Americans feared one
disease over another, and of those 44%, 48% named AIDS and 47% named
cancer); Hilary Stout, 40% of Americans Fear They Will Contract AIDS, a
Poll Indicates, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29, 1987, at 26 (68% of Americans name
AIDS as the nation's most serious health problem, 14% name cancer, and 7%
name heart disease).
3. Jay A. Levy, The Transmission of HIV and Factors Influencing
Progression to AIDS, 95 AM. J. MED. 86, 86 (1993) ("The human
immunodeficiency viruses... have been shown to be the etiologic agents of
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome AIDS.").
4. See U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT
TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC ON HIV INFECTION AND AIDS 1, 6 (1993)
[hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT] ("The two main ways of spreading

H1V are having sex and using contaminated needles to inject drugs. In
addition, infected women can pass HIV infection to their newborns."); Levy,
supra note 3, at 86 ("The known routes of transfer of the AIDS virus are
blood, blood products, intimate sexual activity, and transmission from mother
to child in utero, during delivery, or shortly after birth."); Helena Brett-Smith,
M.D. & Gerald H. Friedland, M.D., Transmission and Treatment, in AIDS
LAW TODAY: A NEw GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 18, 23 (Scott Buris et al. eds.,
1993) ("For infection to occur, an infected person's blood, semen, or vaginal
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people who are infected by HIV will eventually develop AIDS. 5
Besides being fatal, 6 the disease is feared because of the long latency period of the virus. 7 Since HIV may remain latent, a person who is infected may show no symptoms and still pass the vi-

secretions . . . must come into intimate contact with the blood or mucous
membranes.
of an uninfected person."); see also Faya v. Almaraz, 620
A.2d 327, 329 (Md. 1993) ("HIV typically spreads via genital fluids or blood
transmitted from one person to another through sexual contact, the sharing of
needles in intravenous drug use, blood transfusions, infiltration into wounds,
or from mother to child during pregnancy or birth."); Castro v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 153 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697-98 (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1991) ("The overwhelming consensus of medical opinion is
clear: the HIV virus is not spread casually. Rather, it has specific and wellknown modes of transmission through sexual contact, exposure to infected
blood, or blood components, and perinatally from mother to infant."); Bonnie
E. Elber, Note, Negligence as a Cause of Action for Sexual Transmission of
AIDS, 19 U. TOL. L. REv. 923, 927 (1988) ("[T]he virus can be transmitted
via intimate sexual contact, exposure to infected blood, or from an infected
pregnant mother to her fetus.").
5. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 4, at 30 ("[D]ifferent
syndromes related to HIV infection . . . and AIDS-are viewed as sequential
stages that evolve in a predictable pattern . . . in each infected individual.");
see also Faya, 620 A.2d at 329 (stating that medical studies indicate that most
people carrying HIV will develop AIDS).
6. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 4, at 30 ("Once infection
occurs, an irreversible course of progressive illness has been set in
motion .... ."); see also Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 154 Misc. 2d 269,
272, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1016 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1992)
("AIDS ... is ultimately fatal.").
7. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 4, at 33 which states that:
[flollowing seroconversion, most infected people completely recover
their sense of health and well-being and become virtually asymptomatic.
The current understanding is that the virus remains more or less
quiescent within cells during this phase. [However], at a cellular level,
HIV is never biologically latent or inactive, even though infected people
may remain entirely asymptomatic for long periods.
Id.; see also Faya, 620 A.2d at 329 (stating that HIV may remain latent for up
to ten years); Castro, 153 Misc. 2d at 6, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (discussing the
possibility that a victim may not know until much later that he or she is
infected with HIV); Elber, supra note 4, at 924 (stating that AIDS has an
incubation period).
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rus on to another person. 8 While any person can contract HIV, 9
certain groups have a higher exposure to the virus. 10
More frightening is the rate at which the disease is spreading.
The disease has "increased more than 100-fold since [it] was discovered in 1981."11 In 1981, there were approximately 100,000
people across the globe who were infected with HIV. 12 The fig-

ures from 1992 show that the number is now close to thirteen
million. 13 Other statistics predict that, within the next three
years, 3.8 million of those infected with HIV will develop
AIDS. 14 It is no wonder that HIV and its resultant, AIDS, are so
feared.
One of the ways a person can become infected with HIV is by
being exposed to infected blood. 15 Therefore, in New York,
cases have arisen out of a fear of contracting AIDS as a result of
exposure to infected blood through another person's negligent
act.16 In other cases, the fear giving rise to legal action was
8. See Elber, supra note 4, at 924-25 ("[Ihe victim is capable of passing
the virus to others even though he exhibits no symptoms."); see also supra
note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which HIV can be
transmitted).
9. See Elber, supra note 4, at 925 (reporting that AIDS reaces all people
including females, children, and all ethnic and racial groups).
10. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 4, at I ("In the second
decade of the AIDS epidemic, gay men still account for the majority of AIDS
cases reported each year.... "); see also Elber, supra note 4, at 926 (stating
that groups considered at higher risk include homosexual or bisexual men,
drug users, and donees of blood).
11. Marsha F. Goldsmith, 'Critical Moment' at Hand in HIV/AIDS
Pandemic, New Global Strategy to Arrest its SpreadProposed, 268 JAMA 445
(1992) ("According to AIDS in the World 1992, a comprehensive report
produced by the Global AIDS Policy Coalition, 'the soaring number of cases
of AIDS and infections with HIV, combined with a faltering world response,
threatens to send the global epidemic of HIV/AIDS spinning out of
control.'").
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the various ways
in which HIV is transmitted).
16. See, e.g., Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 154 Misc. 2d 269, 583
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1992) (plaintiff-doctor alleged
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based on failure to reveal homosexuality. 17 Consequently, the issue at hand is whether emotional harm, arising out of the fear of
contracting AIDS, constitutes a viable cause of action under the
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.
This Comment will focus on whether the New York courts recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress for the fear of
contracting AIDS as a viable cause of action. Part I of this Comment will initially lay out the elements of negligence to provide a
foundation for the tort 18 and will then discuss the history of negligent infliction of emotional distress in New York. 19 Part II will
consider the cases in New York dealing specifically with the negligent infliction of emotional distress for fear of contracting
AIDS, 20 analogous disease-phobia cases, 2 1 and potential future
scenarios in which the tort may arise. 22 This Comment concludes
by stating that the fear of contracting AIDS, based on the tort of
negligent infliction of emotional distress, is a viable cause of action when the requisite elements are present. 23

negligent infliction of emotional distress after unknowingly operating on an
HIV-positive patient); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 153 Misc. 2d 1, 588
N.Y.S. 2d 695 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1991) (plaintiff alleged fear of

contracting AIDS when pricked by a hypodermic needle negligently disposed
of by the defendant); Hare v. State, 143 Misc. 2d 281, 539 N.Y.S.2d 1018

(Ct. Cl. 1989) (plaintiff feared AIDS when bitten by inmate who was
negligently supervised by the state), aff'd, 173 A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d
125 (2d Dep't 1991).
17. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1987) (plaintiff-wife alleged negligent infliction of
emotional distress for AIDS phobia based on her husband's failure to reveal
his homosexuality).
18. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 31-84 and accompanying text.

20. See infra notes 85-149 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 150-75 and accompanying text.

22. See infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
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I. NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS IN NEW YORK
A. Elements

A discussion of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress requires that the underlying elements first be addressed.
These elements include all the requisite elements of negligence:
namely, duty, 2 4 breach, 2 5 causation, 2 6 and injury. 2 7 While in a

basic negligence action there need only be a "reasonably close
causal connection between the conduct and the resulting
injury," 2 8 in an action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress, there must be a direct causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the injury which the plaintiff sustains. 2 9
Furthermore, since the injury in a negligent infliction of
emotional distress cause of action is fear or emotional harm, the
30
injury must be substantiated by the genuineness of that fear.
24. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th ed. 1984). Duty is "[an]... obligation, recognized
by the law, requiring the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct,
for the protection of others against unreasonable risks." Id.
25. Id. Breach is "[a] failure on the person's part to conform to the
standard required." Id.
26. Id. at 165. Causation is "[a] reasonably close causal connection
between the conduct and the resulting injury." Id.
27. Id. Injury is "[a]ctual loss or damage resulting to the interests of
another." Id.
28. ld.
29. See Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Ctr., 70 N.Y.2d
697, 512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987) (holding that emotional
injuries directly caused by the defendant's breach are actionable); Kennedy v.
McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1983)
(holding that emotional injuries are compensable when they result directly
from a breach).
30. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638 (1975) (stating that claim of emotional harm will be allowed as long as
there is a showing of genuineness); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176
N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (stating that genuineness of proof of the
claim must be looked for in the difficult cases).
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What follows is a discussion of how the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress has evolved in New York over the
past century.
B. The Physical Impact Requirement31
In 1896, the New York Court of Appeals decided the case of
Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co. 32 in which the plaintiff, a
pregnant woman, was waiting for a horse and carriage, when one
came dangerously close, but did not actually touch her. 33 The issue before the court was whether the plaintiff could recover for
her fear when it resulted in her having a miscarriage, which she
alleged was caused by the defendant's negligence. 34 Finding an
absence of personal injury or physical impact, the court held that
there could be no recovery for injuries resulting from mere
fright. 35 Even though the fright may have caused subsequent
physical injuries, 36 an initial physical impact was required to
recover for injuries arising from fear. 37 The court reasoned that
without physical impact, the result would be "a flood of litigation
in cases where the injury complained of may be easily feigned

31. See KEErON Er AL., supra note 24, § 54, at 363 (stating that a
physical impact was used by courts as a means of qualifying a mental
disturbance as real, and that a physical impact could be anything including a

"slight blow" or a "trifling bum").

32. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), overruled by Battalla v. State, 10
N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). Battalla overruled
Mitchell by holding that the absence of a personal injury or a physical impact

would not preclude the plaintiff from maintaining an action against the
defendant for mental distress.
33. Id. at 108, 45 N.E. at 354.
34. Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354.
35. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354. "These considerations lead to the
conclusion that no recovery can be had for injuries sustained by the negligence

of another, where there is no immediate personal injury." Id. at 110, 45 N.E.
at 355.
36. The miscarriage which resulted occurred subsequent to plaintiff's
fright. Id. at 109, 45 N.E. at 354.
37. In order for the plaintiff to recover for her fear, the horse would have
had to actually touch the plaintiff. Id. at 109-10, 45 N.E. at 354-55.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss1/13

6

Zakarin: AIDS Phobia

1993]
without detection,"

AIDS PHOBIA
38

269

and that "a wide field would be opened for

fictitious or speculative claims." 39
A half-century later the landmark case of Ferrarav. Galluchio 4° was decided. In Ferrara,the defendants performed x-ray
treatments on the plaintiff's shoulder. 4 1 As a result of the negligently administered treatments, the plaintiff developed severe
blisters on her skin. 42 The plaintiff consulted a dermatologist
who informed her of the possibility of the blisters becoming cancerous. 43 This information caused the plaintiff to develop cancer
phobia. 44 While the plaintiff was awarded damages for her fear
of cancer, 45 it is unclear whether this case abolished the physical
impact requirement, since the plaintiff did incur an initial
physical injury. 46 What is clear, however, is that this case
allowed a cause of action for fear caused by another's negligence.
Whereas the Mitchell court did not explicitly state that a cause of
action for fear based on another's negligence was a viable claim,
the Ferraracourt held that "[f]reedom from mental disturbance is
now a protected interest in this State. "47
38. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
39. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355.
40. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
41. Id. at 18, 152 N.E.2d at 250, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 18-19, 152 N.E.2d at 250-51, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
44. Id. at 19-20, 152 N.E.2d at 251, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
45. Id. at 22, 152 N.E.2d at 253, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
46. Since the plaintiff initially sustained blisters, it is possible that the
court granted recovery for her fear based on this initial impact, rather than just
on the fear of developing cancer.
47. Ferrara,5 N.Y.2d at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
The court addressed the fact that cases involving purely emotional injuries
have the implicit danger of being false claims, but strongly concluded that this
truism should not impede courts from looking to the facts of each case to come
to decisions based on medical and other acceptable and genuine forms of
proof. Id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000. It has also
been stated that:
[m]ental suffering is no more difficult to estimate in financial terms, and
no less a real injury, than "physical" pain; it is not an independent
intervening cause, but a thing brought about by the defendant's
negligence itself, and its consequences may follow in unbroken
sequence from that negligence; and while it may be true that its
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C. New York Abandons Physical Impact
New York abandoned the physical impact requirement in Battalla v. State.4 8 In Battalla, a young boy was placed on a ski lift
chair, but was not properly secured. 4 9 As a result of this negligent act, the boy experienced fright, which subsequently caused
him illness and other physical manifestations. 50 This decision
overturned Mitchell, in that, even though there was no physical
impact which caused the boy's fright and subsequent injuries,
judgment was nonetheless granted to the plaintiff. 5 1 In response
to the policy arguments set out in Mitchell requiring a physical
impact, 52 the Battalla court stated that "[a]lthough fraud, extra
litigation and a measure of speculation are, of course, possibilities, it is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its jurisdiction." 53 Although the Battalla court agreed that damages
might be sometimes hard to prove, 54 the court added that it
"must look to the quality and genuineness of proof, and rely to
an extent on the contemporary sophistication of the medical profession and the ability of the court and jury to weed out the dishonest claims." 55 In abandoning the physical impact requirement,
the Battalla decision is consistent with the decisions of a majority
of jurisdictions that have dealt with this issue. 56
consequences are seldom very serious unless there is some predisposing
physical condition, the law is not for the protection of the physically
sound alone.
KEETON Er AL., supra note 24, § 54, at 360 (emphasis added).
48. 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).
49. Id. at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 732, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
52. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354
(1896) (holding that a physical impact was necessary to prevent claims that
may be feigned).
53. Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d at 240-41, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at
37.
54. Id. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
55. Id. at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
56. See KEErON ET AL., supra note 24, § 54, at 364 (stating that the

majority of courts have abandoned

requirement of physical impact);

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965) (stating that an actor is still
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Although most jurisdictions have abandoned the physical impact requirement, 57 it has been replaced with the requirement of
a consequent physical manifestation or injury resulting from the
emotional harm. 5 8 New York, however, as demonstrated by the
Battalla decision, does not require a physical manifestation or

injury resulting from the emotional harm in order to justify a
claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 59 Even if the
Battalla decision is interpreted as allowing recovery for emotional harm based only on the existence of physical harm arising
from fear, 60 the court's decision in Johnson v. State61 holds
otherwise. The Johnson court held that as long as there was
62
enough evidence to prove that emotional harm was suffered,

liable even if the harm is only a result of consequences of the fright and not
caused by an initial injury); see, e.g., Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163
(Colo. 1978); Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148 (Me. 1979);
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982); Sears Roebuck & Co.
v. Young, 384 So. 2d 69 (Miss. 1980); Fournell v. Usher Pest Control Co.,
305 N.W.2d 605 (Neb. 1981); Wyatt v. Gilmore, 290 S.E.2d 790 (N.C.
1982); Melton v. Allen, 580 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1978).
57. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
58. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 24, § 54, at 361 ("Where the

defendant's negligence causes only mental disturbance, without accompanying
physical injury, illness or other physical consequences, and in the absence of
some other independent basis for tort liability, the great majority of courts still
hold that in the ordinary case there can be no recovery.").
59. See Battalla, 10 N.Y.2d at 242, 176 N.E.2d at 731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d
at 38 ("[L]ook to the quality and genuineness of proof... and the ability of
the court and jury to weed out the dishonest claims.").
60. See id.at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35 (plaintiff
suffered consequential injuries as a result of his fright, and therefore the
decision might be interpreted as recovery being granted because of those
injuries).
61. 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975). In
Johnson, the plaintiff's mother was a patient in the defendant-hospital. The
hospital erroneously sent a telegram to the plaintiffs aunt stating that the
plaintiffs mother had died. Id. at 380, 334 N.E.2d at 591, 372 N.Y.S.2d at
640. Consequently, funeral arrangements were made and a wake was held. At
the wake, the plaintiff examined the corpse and realized it was not her mother.
Id. As a result of this incident, the plaintiff suffered severe emotional harm,
for which the court allowed recovery. Id. at 379-80, 334 N.E.2d at 591, 372
N.Y.S.2d at 639.
62. Id.at 383-84, 334 N.E.2d at 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 643.
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and there was a "guarantee of genuineness,"

63

then one could re-

cover for emotional harm suffered as a result of another's negligent act. 6 4 Generally, the Johnson court held that if a duty is
breached, a plaintiff may recover for emotional injuries which are
proven to be directly caused by that breach. 65 The court of appeals has, time and again, reiterated the elements of a cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and, in each
of those decisions, the court has not added an element of physical
manifestation resulting from the emotional harm. 66 This rule of

not requiring a subsequent physical injury is utilized in only a
67
minority of states.

63. Id. at 384, 334 N.E.2d at 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 643 (citing Ferrara v.
Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000
(1958)); see also Leahy v. Federal Express Corp., 613 F. Supp. 906, 908
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The New York courts, while accepting claims of
emotional distress, scrutinize claims carefully, seeking guarantees of
genuineness.").
64. Johnson, 37 N.Y.2d at 383-84, 334 N.E.2d at 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d at
643.
65. Id.
66. See Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Ctr., 70 N.Y.2d
697, 699, 512 N.E.2d 538, 539, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955, 956 (1987) ("[W]here
there is a breach of a duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, the breach of that
duty resulting in emotional harm is actionable."); Kennedy v. McKesson Co.,
58 N.Y.2d 500, 506, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1335, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (1983)
(emotional injury is compensable when there is a breach of duty which directly
causes the emotional injury); Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 111-12, 366
N.E.2d 64, 65, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365 (1977) ("[W]e have held that there
may be recovery for the emotional harm, even in the absence of fear of
potential physical injury, to one subjected directly to the negligence of another
as long as the psychic injury was genuine, substantial, and proximately caused
by the defendant's conduct."); Lando v. State, 39 N.Y.2d 803, 805, 351
N.E.2d 426, 426-27, 385 N.Y.S.2d 759, 759-60 (1976) (allowing claimant
recovery for emotional harm resulting from defendant hospital's negligence).
67. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 24, § 54, at 364-65 ("[A] handful of
courts have taken the final step and permitted a general negligence cause of
action for the infliction of serious emotional distress, without regard to
whether the plaintiff suffered any physical injury or illness as a result."); see,
e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical Ctr., Inc., 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981)
(holding that mental suffering is recognizable without requiring physical
injuries); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980)
("The essential question is one of proof; whether the plaintiff has suffered a
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D. Confusion in the Courts
While it seems clear that the New York Court of Appeals does
not require a physical manifestation of the emotional harm suffered in order to prove the genuineness of a claim, 68 lower courts
have nonetheless confused the issue. 69 In Green v. Leibowitz70
and Lancellotti v. Howard,7 1 the Appellate Division, Second Department added an element by requiring that the plaintiff be in
danger of physical harm to recover for any emotional harm
suffered. 7 2 These decisions were premised on the court of
appeals' decision in Bovsun v. Sanperi.7 3 In Bovsun, the court
serious and compensable injury should not turn on this artificial and often
arbitrary classification scheme."); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw.
1970) (holding that mental distress claims should look to the genuineness of
the claim); Chappetta v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 415 So. 2d 1019 (La. Ct.
App. 1982) (holding that damages for emotional distress should be awarded
even in the absence of accompanying physical injuries); Bass v. Nooney Co.,
646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (holding that impact rule and "physical injury"
resulting from the emotional distress should be abandoned); Schultz v.
Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 1983) (holding that a
contemporaneous physical injury is unnecessary for negligent infliction of
emotional distress cause of action).
68. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
70. 118 A.D.2d 756, 500 N.Y.S.2d 146 (2d Dep't 1986) (holding that
while physical injury is no longer a necessary element for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, the cause of action must be premised upon a breach of
duty which "unreasonably endangers the plaintiff's physical safety").
71. 155 A.D.2d 588, 547 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1989) (holding that
emotional harm can only be recovered if there is a breach of duty which places
the plaintiff in danger of physical safety).
72. Green, 118 A.D.2d at 757, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 148; Lancellotti, 155
A.D.2d at 588, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
73. 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984). In
Bovsun, Mr. Bovsun was seriously injured when his disabled car was struck in
the rear, and he was pinned between his car and another vehicle. His wife and
daughter were also injured, but not as seriously. Mrs. Bovsun and her
daughter brought an action for emotional distress arising from their
observation of Mr. Bovsun's injuries. Id. at 224, 461 N.E.2d at 844, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 358. The court of appeals allowed recovery based on the fact they
were in the "zone of danger." Id. at 223-24 , 461 N.E.2d at 850, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 364.
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stated that in order to recover in circumstances in which the
plaintiff was a witness to a "serious physical injury or death inflicted by the defendant's conduct on a member of the plaintiff's
immediate family," 74 the element of "endangering the plaintiff's
physical safety" 75 should be added. Since Bovsun refers to
situations in which the plaintiff is a witness and not directly affected by the defendant's negligence, the lower courts' reliance
on Bovsun in Green and Lancellotti is misplaced. 76 If the Appel-

late Division, Second Department in Green and Lancellotti
wanted to deny recovery, it should have done so based on the
lack of the genuineness of the claim and the insufficiency of

proof of emotional injury in order to grant recovery. 77 Notably,
however, not al lower courts have added this extra element, 7 8
79
and one even criticized the Green court for doing so.

In sum, New York does recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress for purely emotional injuries, 80 without an initial physical impact 81 and without residual
74. Id. at 224, 461 N.E.2d at 844, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
75. Id. at 229, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
76. The New York Court of Appeals, in Bovsun, recognized plaintiff's
right to recover those damages attributable to emotional distress which were
caused by a contemporaneous observation of an injury or death of a member of
the immediate family, caused by the same conduct of the defendant. Id. at 233,
461 N.E.2d at 850, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
77. The Green and Lancellotti courts denied recovery because there was no
recognition of "a cause of action as broad as that asserted by the plaintiff."
Green, 118 A.D.2d at 757, 500 N.Y.S.2d at 148; Lancellotti, 155 A.D.2d at
588, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
78. See Nadal v. State, 110 A.D.2d 890, 891, 488 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (2d
Dep't 1985) (holding that psychological injuries are recoverable when they are
directly caused by the defendant's breach); Ace v. State, 146 Misc. 2d 954,
959, 553 N.Y.S.2d 605, 609 (Ct. Cl. 1990) (finding that psychological
injuries directly caused by defendant's breach are recoverable).
79. See Martell v. St. Charles Hosp., 137 Misc. 2d 980, 983, 523
N.Y.S.2d 342, 344 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1987) ("In this court's view, the
Appellate Division, Second Department, in Green v. Leibowitz ... has added
a requirement of an additional element of cause of action to recover damages
for emotional injuries not intended to be included by the Court of Appeals.").
80. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussion of Ferrarav.
Galluchio).
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physical manifestations. 82 Thus, in order to maintain a prima facie case for negligent infliction of emotional distress, prospective
plaintiffs need only show breach of a duty owed that directly
results in their emotional harm. 83 The emotional harm will be
compensable if it can be genuinely substantiated. 84
II. THE FEAR OF CONTRACTING AIDS
A. The Lower Court Decisions on Fearof AIDS
Although the New York Court of Appeals has not yet been
confronted with the issue of whether the negligent infliction of
emotional distress for the fear of contracting AIDS is a viable
cause of action, lower courts in New York have had an opportunity to review the question. 85 From the discussion above, it appears that in order to sustain a cause of action for the fear of
contracting AIDS, a plaintiff must demonstrate the existence of
the aforementioned requisite elements. 86 The issue in the lower
courts focuses on what constitutes a genuine and substantial fear

81. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text (discussion of Battalla

v. State).
82. See supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (discussion of Johnson

v. State).
83. See supranotes 24-29, 65-66 and accompanying text.
84. See supranotes 30, 55, 63 and accompanying text; see also Johnson v.

State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975); Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961).

85. See, e.g., Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 154 Misc. 2d 269, 583
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1992); Castro v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 153 Misc. 2d 1, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1991);
Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1987); Hare v. State, 143 Misc. 2d 281, 539 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Ct. CI. 1989),
aff'd, 173 A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1991).
86. See supra notes 24-84 and accompanying text (discussing the elements
of the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress and the jurisprudence
relative to this tort in New York).
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of contracting AIDS. 87 While the number of cases are few, they

are relatively recent.
In 1987, the Supreme Court, Kings County, decided the case of
Doe v. Doe. 8 8 In a divorce proceeding, the plaintiff-wife sought

damages from the defendant-husband based on her fear of contracting AIDS. 89 This fear was premised upon the defendant-husband's alleged failure to reveal his homosexuality. 90 While the
Doe court stated that this action was for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, 9 1 the language used by plaintiff in her complaint spoke of duty and breach, 92 and the court addressed

plaintiffs allegations with reasoning far more consistent with the
93
tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress.

After stating that it would be wrong to allow plaintiff-wife to
recover damages for her alleged AIDS phobia in the midst of a
divorce action, 94 the Doe court continued, in dicta, to analyze the
87. See infra notes 88-149 and accompanying text (discussing New York
cases which turn on the degree of connection between the fear inducing event
and the fear itself).
88. 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1987).
89. Id. at 1018, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 597. Paragraph 46 of the complaint read:
"That solely by reason of defendant's breach of his confidential relationship
with plaintiff and defendant's failure to disclose his homosexuality and 'at
high-risk' candidacy for ARC and AIDS, plaintiff has sustained severe
emotional and psychological distress and potentially life-threatening
disabilities." Id. Paragraph 47 of the complaint read: "[P]laintiff has endured
great pain and suffering and has incurred a severe traumatic neurosis
manifested by depression, anxiety, obsessional symptoms and severe AIDSphobia, evidenced also by frequent crying spells, sleeplessness, nervousness,
paranoia, and outbursts of rage." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
93. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d at 1018-20, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 598-99. The Doe
court makes references to Johnson v. State, Ferrara v. Galluchio, and
Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr. in making its decision. These
cases, however, are all premised on the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress.
94. Id. at 1018, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 597-98. The court stated:
[Plaintiff-wife] is attempting to obtain a division of the marital property
based on fault. Division of property by degree of fault has clearly been
disallowed in this State absent a showing of exceptional circumstances
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plaintiff-wife's action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 95 Relying on Johnson, Doe maintained that the courts in

New York are hesitant to grant recovery based on purely emotional harm, and therefore denied plaintiffs recovery. 96 However, this reliance on Johnson is misfounded. 9 7 While the Doe

court stated that allowing this cause of action would equal the
"opening of Pandora's Box" 98 because any divorce proceeding
based on adultery would seek damages for the fear of AIDS, 99
the court of appeals would hold otherwise based on its decisions

in Battalla and Johnson.100 While both cases recognized that
(citations omitted). The court will not countenance this blatant attempt
to avoid the dictates of the Legislature. If plaintiff believes this is an
exceptional circumstance requiring the use of fault for property
distribution, let her press that point within her matrimonial causes of
action.
Id. Thus, the Doe court refused to entertain the tort claim and insisted that
plaintiff-wife pursue compensation for her AIDS phobia within her divorce
action or not at all.
95. Id. at 1018, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
96. Id. at 1018, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 598 ("[l]n the absence of
contemporaneous or consequential physical injury, courts have been reluctant
to permit recovery for negligently caused psychological trauma, with ensuing
emotional harm alone." (quoting Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 381, 334
N.E.2d 590, 592, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 641 (1975))).
97. The Doe court, in relying on the Johnson decision, restated the general
rule from which Johnson began its analysis. However, the Doe court failed to
apply the eventual holding of Johnson. The Johnson court held that purely
emotional harm can be compensated when it results from a breach of duty
which directly caused the harm. Johnson, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590,
372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975).
98. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d at 1019, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
99. Id. ("If this cause of action were permitted to continue, any party to a
matrimonial action who alleged adultery would now have a separate tort action
for damages for 'AIDS-phobia' because in this day and age any deviation from
the marital nest could possibly result in exposure to AIDS.").
100. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638 (1975) (holding that purely emotional injuries are injuries recoverable in
tort so long as there is duty, breach, and direct cause); Battalla v. State, 10
N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (holding that despite
the chance of fictitious claims where no physical impact existed, purely
emotional injury resulting from an event which then leads to physical
manifestations are actionable claims).
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claims based on purely emotional injuries are perhaps more easily
feigned than those which require physical injuries, both cases
nevertheless held that emotional injuries are actionable so long as
the court is able to find a guarantee of genuineness. 10 1 Pursuant
to this judicially created requirement, the Doe court did draw attention to the fact that the plaintiff's claim was not substantiated
by credible proof. 102 Having determined that plaintiffs fear was
unfounded, the court stated that to allow a cause of action for the
fear of contracting AIDS would be going above and beyond what
10 3
the court of appeals had intended.
The court of appeals, in its decisions on negligent infliction of
emotional distress, has emphasized the importance of analyzing
cases in light of their specific and unique sets of facts. 104 Specifically, it has looked to the elements of duty, breach, direct
cause, and proof of a valid claim of emotional harm to sustain a
cause of action. 105 Therefore, the Doe court should have denied
recovery only on the basis of inadequate proof of mental suffering, rather than precluding the cause of action. The Doe court did
give some indication that a claimant would have to show more
than an alleged fear, and that a court will not tolerate claims
which are not substantiated. 106 Furthermore, the case indicates
101. Johnson, 37 N.Y.2d at 384, 334 N.E.2d at 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 643
(relying on Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21, 152 N.E.2d 249, 252, 176
N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000 (1958) and Batalla, 10 N.Y.2d at 242, 176 N.E.2d at
731-32, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 38).
102. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d at 1019, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 598. The court stated:

"[We are] faced with a psychological claim based on a fear that is based on
attenuated probabilities which in turn are based not on any medical fact or
proof...." Id.
103. Id. at 1021, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 599-600. "This court will not.., go far
beyond the dictates of this State's highest court and thereby open the
floodgates of psychological injury or 'phobia' cases." Id.
104. Johnson, 37 N.Y.2d at 383-84, 334 N.E.2d at 593, 372 N.Y.S.2d at

643. The court stated that courts in general should look to the claim and the
genuineness of it, rather than precluding the cause of action altogether. Id.
Therefore, each tribunal should be guided by the facts of each set of

circumstances that comes before it. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Doe, 136 Misc. 2d at 1019, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 598 ("The court is

faced with a psychological claim based on a fear that is based on attenuated
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that while a person may claim that he or she is suffering from a
fear of contracting AIDS, that in itself will not substantiate the
genuineness needed in order to sustain a cause of action. 107
In 1989, the New York courts were again faced with a claim of
AIDS phobia. In Hare v. State, 10 8 the claimant-correction officer
alleged that he suffered a fear of contracting AIDS as a result of
being bitten by a prison inmate who was negligently supervised
by the state. 1° 9 The Hare court properly identified New York
law, 110 but denied recovery based on the fact that plaintiff's fear
was speculative and not the direct result of the defendant's negligence. 111 The court maintained that plaintiffs fear was based on
the statement of a nurse on duty who said that the inmate may
have AIDS. 1 12 The court determined the nurse's statement to be
a rumor at best and held that, since the plaintiffs fear was not
directly caused by the defendant's breach, recovery would be
denied. 113 Moreover, the court denied recovery because there
was no proof that the plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS was
genuine. 114 Notably, however, the Hare court did not automatically dismiss a cause of action based on the fear of contracting
AIDS as did the Doe court. 115
probabilities which in turn are based not on any medical facts or
proof....").
107. Id.
108. 143 Misc. 2d 281, 539 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Ct. Cl. 1989), aff'd, 173
A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1991).

109. Id. at 284, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 1020. The claimant, in an attempt to help
other correction officers stop an inmate from plunging a fork into his throat,
tried to remove the fork from the inmate's hand, and consequently was bit by
the inmate. ld. at 282, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 1019.
110. Id. at 285, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 1021 (claimant must prove that his fear of
contracting AIDS is directly tied to defendant's negligence (relying on
Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Medical Ctr., 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d
538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987))).
111. Hare, 143 Misc. 2d at 286, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 1021 ("The evidence is
simply too speculative and remote to award damages on that basis.").
112. Id. at 283, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 1020.
113. Id. at 286, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 1021.

114. Id. ("[E]very test has proven the claimant's fear to be unfounded.").
115. Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 1021, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 599-600

(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1987); see also Harry H. Lipsig, AIDS Phobia and
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While Hare did not specifically state that there could be a cause
of action for the fear of contracting AIDS, the Supreme Court,
116
New York County, in Castro v. New York Life Insurance Co.
did. In Castro, the plaintiff was pricked by a hypodermic needle
which was negligently disposed of by the defendant, and as a re117
sult commenced a lawsuit alleging a fear of contracting AIDS.
The Castro court properly stated that a cause of action existed
because it reasoned that the plaintiff's fear of AIDS was directly
caused by the defendant's breach, 118 and the plaintiff's fear was
considered to be a genuine fear. 119 To determine the genuineness
of the plaintiff's claim, the court looked for a specific occurrence
which could be tied to the plaintiff's fear. 120 Additionally, the
court relied on the plaintiff's doctor who documented her fear, 12 1
and on the informational campaign which was directed at educating people about AIDS. 122 Therefore, her claim of fear of contracting AIDS was more substantial, and accordingly, the court
sustained her cause of action. 123
In analyzing Hare and Castro, one may wonder why the
plaintiff in Hare did not have a viable cause of action when the
plaintiff in Castro did. There are two reasons for the disparity
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 26, 1992, at 3, 4
(1992) ("Significantly, the [Hare] court did not preclude bringing a claim for
AIDS phobia but, sitting as both trier of law and facts, denied recovery based
on that particular case only.").
116. 153 Misc. 2d 1, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1991).
117. Id. at 2-3, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 695-96.

118. Id. at 6, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698 ("[Plaintiff's] claim for mental anguish
and 'AIDS phobia' is directly tied to the date on which she allegedly received
the hypodermic puncture to her right thumb.").

119. Id. at 5-6, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98 (claim tied to a distinct event,
medical proof, and media information about AIDS shows genuineness of
claim).
120. Id. at 6, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
121. Id. at 5, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (diagnosing plaintiff with a
"Generalized Anxiety Disorder, acute, severe, disabling with multiple neurotic
symptomatology" which was "causally related to the incident").
122. Id. at 6, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (stating that media attention to the AIDS
crisis helps to substantiate a fear).
123. Id. at 6-7, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
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between the cases. The obvious reason is that the plaintiffs fear
of contracting AIDS in the Hare case was not directly caused by
the defendant's negligence, 12 4 and in Castro, it was. 125 The

more implicit reason is that in Hare, the identity of the inmate
who bit the plaintiff was known, and, since there was no evidence to show that the inmate had AIDS, the plaintiff's fear was

unfounded. 126 In contrast, the identity of the person in Castro
who used the needle prior to the time that the plaintiff was
pricked was not known. 127 Accordingly, the Castro court reasoned that:
[g]iven the massive informational campaign waged by Federal,
State and local health officials over the last few years in an effort
to educate the public about this dreadful disease, any reasonable
person exposed to this information who is stuck by a used and
discarded hypodermic needle and syringe from which blood was
apparently drawn could develop a fear of contracting AIDS. 128
124. Hare v. State, 143 Misc. 2d 281, 286, 539 N.Y.S.2d 1018, 1021 (Ct.
Cl. 1989) ("To award damages simply on the basis of risk, perceived solely on
an unsubstantiated statement by Nurse Bergen, and a resulting fear or threat of
developing the disease in the future is not the law of this jurisdiction."), aft'd,
173 A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1991).
125. Castro, 153 Misc. 2d at 6, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (plaintiff's claim for
AIDS phobia is directly tied to the date of the incident where she alleges that
her thumb was punctured by a hypodermic needle).
126. Hare, 143 Misc. 2d at 286, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 1021-22 (stating that
there was no evidence that the assailant had AIDS).
127. See Castro, 153 Misc. 2d at 2, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 695 (the needle was
thrown out in a small waste container, thereby making the identity unknown);
see also Lipsig, supra note 115, at 4 ("[The identity of the contaminator...
is unknown, making the fear of contraction more reasonable.").
128. Castro, 153 Misc. 2d at 6, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698. Other campaigns
have also been directed at educating the public about AIDS; see, e.g., Sylvia
Mayer Baker, Comment, HIV: Reasons to Apply Traditional Methods of
Disease Control to the Spread of HIV, 29 Hous. L. REv. 891, 909 (1992)
("Education... has constituted the government's primary weapon in its effort
to combat the spread of HIV."); Marsha F. Goldsmith, Physicians at AMA
Amsterdam News Seminar Offer Panoramic View of Their Varied Roles in
Pandemic, 268 JAMA 1237 (1992) (stating that of the 13 countries
participating in the seminar, most identified educational campaigns as a
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Therefore, if the source of the possible contamination is unknown, then a fear of contracting AIDS will be considered
genuine. On the other hand, if the source of contamination is
known, there must be some direct evidence that the source has
AIDS or is HIV-positive. Thus, the plaintiffs claim in Hare
would have been more genuine if the plaintiff developed his
alleged fear as a result of being told by the inmate himself that
the inmate had AIDS, rather than by hearing a rumor from a
nurse that the inmate may have had AIDS. 129
In Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 130 although it was not sustained, the court held that a cause of action for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress for the fear of contracting AIDS is
a viable cause of action. 131 In Ordway, a person was arrested and
subsequently brought to the hospital. 132 The plaintiff-doctor

performed surgery on the patient. 133 At a later date the doctor

was made aware that the patient had tested positive for HIV. 134
primary tool in combating the pandemic); Jean Marzello, Talking to Kids
about AIDS, 63 PARENT'S MAG. 118 (1988) (stating that due to the growing
awareness of AIDS, the surgeon general has asked both parents and teachers to
begin educating children about AIDS "as young as possible"); Teri Randall,
CDC's Hot Line: 'America Responds to AIDS,' 263 JAMA 2587 (1990)
(discussing the CDC's hot line giving answers concerning HIV and AIDS to
over 3,000 callers per day and the increased volume of calls due to advertising
of the hot line by popular celebrities such as singer/performer Madonna and
the rock group KISS).
129. See Hare, 143 Misc. 2d at 286, 539 N.Y.S.2d at 1021 ("To award
damages simply on the basis of risk, perceived solely on an unsubstantiated
statement by Nurse Bergen ... is not the law of this jurisdiction."); see also
People v. Juan R., 153 Misc. 2d 400, 408 n.5, 589 N.Y.S.2d 256, 261-62 n.5
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1992) (assuming that there was a breach of duty owed
to the police officer, the police officer apprehending the suspect for assault
would have a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
when the assailant bit the officer and told him that he had AIDS).
130. 154 Misc. 2d 269, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County
1992).
131. Id. at 272-73, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1016 (stating that case law previously
decided shows that AIDS phobia is a viable cause of action).
132. Id. at 270, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1015.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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Although the plaintiff-doctor wore gloves during the surgical
procedures, he claimed that, had he been made aware of the patient's condition, he would have taken extra precautions. 135 The
court denied recovery to the plaintiff for several reasons. First,
the court stated that the plaintiff-doctor had not "alleged that the
operations he performed on the patient were in any way remarkable." 136 Additionally, the court added that the plaintiff's affi-

davit stating that he lived in fear of contracting AIDS was not
proof enough to establish genuineness. 137 Therefore, since his
fear was not genuine, relief was denied.
While the Ordway court alluded to a requirement of physical
injury, 13 8 it did so in reliance on Lancellotti v. Howard.139 Previously discussed, however, is the fact that the added element of
being in danger of physical injury is misplaced. 140 Nonetheless,
the Ordway court correctly reiterated the requirement that the

135. Id. Specifically, he was referring to "the use of a full face shield or
goggles, a specific type of respirator or breathing protector, double gloves,
changing gown every 30 minutes and wearing knee-high boots." Id.
136. Id at 273, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1016-17 (stating that the doctor's skin was
not pierced, nor was there any evidence of a patient bite, broken gloves, or
anything else that would distinguish this operation from any other).
137. Id. at 273, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1017. "The plaintiff's allegations of
subsequent injury consist of a general averment that he lives in 'fear and
uncertainty and continually believe[s] [that he has] contracted the AIDS
virus.'" Id.
138. Id. at 271-72, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1016 ("Despite the absence of a rigid
requirement of physical injury, however, the indicia of legitimacy invariably
includes 'some form of physical trauma, however minimal, stemming from the
defendant's negligence.'" (quoting Lancellotti v. Howard, 155 A.D.2d 588,
590, 547 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (2d Dep't 1989))).
139. 155 A.D.2d 588, 547 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1989).
140. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638 (1975) (physical injury requirement discarded and replaced with an
examination by the court to determine if the facts of the case contain a
guarantee of genuineness); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729,
219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (holding that the need for accompanying physical
injuries is abolished); see also supra notes 68-84 and accompanying text
(discussing the fact that while some lower courts have added this extra
element, the New York Court of Appeals only requires duty, breach, direct
cause and genuineness of the claim).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1993

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1993], Art. 13

TOURO LA W REVIEW

[Vol 10

defendant must breach a duty which results in the cause of the
plaintiffs emotional harm. 141
Perhaps, however, what the Ordway court was trying to manifest was that for the disease to be transmitted, there must be some

type of physical contact. While the court of appeals does not
require a physical impact, 142 the only way for HIV to be
transmitted is through some sort of physical exposure to the virus. 14 3 In Ordway, since the plaintiff-doctor's bodily fluids did
not come in contact with the patient's bodily fluids, the doctor
could not have contracted HIV or AIDS. 144 Therefore, as a prelude to proving the genuineness of the fear of contracting AIDS,
there must be some evidence of possible exposure to HIV through
one of the ways in which it is transmitted. 145 This element of ex-

posure is only necessary to establish genuineness and is not to be
confused with requiring a physical impact or consequential physical manifestation. However, proving exposure to HIV is only the
foundation of showing genuineness, it is not a substitution. The
plaintiff must still show that he or she was in actual fear of contracting AIDS. 146
The Hare and Castro courts did not discuss the need to estab-

lish proof of exposure to HIV. The probable reason is that in
those cases, unlike Ordway, the exposure to HIV was self-evident

and did not need to be discussed.

147

In Ordway, the need for

141. Ordway, 154 Misc. 2d at 272, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1016.
142. See Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34 (1961) (physical impact requirement abandoned).
143. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which
HIV is transmitted).
144. Ordway, 154 Misc. 2d at 273, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1016-17 ("There was
no broken glove, pierced skin, patient bite, etc ..... ).
145. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which
HIV is transmitted).
146. See Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d
638 (1975) (claim of emotional harm will be allowed as long as there is a
showing of genuineness); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729,
219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (plaintiff must show that his claim is genuine).
147. In Hare, the plaintiff was bitten, and therefore his blood was
susceptible to being exposed to the inmate's blood which may have been
infected with HIV. Hare v. State, 143 Misc. 2d 281, 282, 539 N.Y.S.2d
1018, 1019 (Ct. Cl. 1989), aff'd, 173 A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d
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something "remarkable" was, in essence, a need to prove that the
plaintiff was actually exposed to the possibility of contracting
AIDS. In the absence of exposure, a plaintiffs claim for fear of
contracting AIDS cannot be reasonably genuine.
It appears from these lower court decisions that the New York
Court of Appeals would uphold a cause of action for the fear of
contracting AIDS based on another's negligent act if the original
requirements set forth by the court are present. 14 8 Additionally,
the court of appeals would presumably require the various methods of proving genuineness as described above, 14 9 including, a
direct link to the plaintiffs fear, medical documentation, plaintiff's reliance on outside information, and proof of actual exposure to HIV.
B. Analogous Disease-PhobiaCases
In addition to the aforementioned discussion, it seems probable
that the New York Court of Appeals would sustain a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress for fear of
contracting AIDS based on analogous disease-phobia cases. In
Ferrarav. Galluchio,150 the court upheld a plaintiff's claim of
cancer phobia. 151 While the court at that time may have required
a physical impact to grant recovery, 152 the Ferraracourt determined that emotional harm is recoverable as long as there is ade-

Dep't 1991). In Castro, the plaintiff was pricked with a hypodermic needle,
and therefore was susceptible to being exposed to the possible infected blood

on the needle. Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 153 Misc. 2d 1, 2, 588
N.Y.S.2d 695, 695 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1991).
148. See supra notes 24-30, 62-66 and accompanying text (duty, breach,
proximate cause, and genuineness of claim).
149. See supra notes 119-22.
150. 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958).
151. Id. at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 999.

152. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that the
plaintiff initially sustained blisters, and that the court may not have granted

recovery for her fear of cancer without the initial impact of the blisters).
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In support of the genuineness of

the plaintiffs claim the court stated:
[i]t is common knowledge among laymen and even more widely
among laywomen that wounds which do not heal over long periods of time frequently become cancerous. Physical culture lectures to high school and college students, radio advice from life
insurance companies, newspaper daily articles by doctors - all
give the same advice. 154

This is analogous to the way in which information is given today
regarding AIDS. 155 As a person in 1956 would reasonably fear
cancer from x-ray bums given the informational campaign of that
time period, a person in 1993 would reasonably fear AIDS from

being exposed to blood or other bodily fluids which may be infected with HIV given the media's extensive distribution of information concerning the AIDS virus.
In Martell v. St. Charles Hospital,156 the fear of cancer was

again in issue. In Martell, the plaintiff sought to recover for
emotional injuries as a consequence of being negligently misinformed by the defendant-doctors that she was suffering from cancer. 157 Holding that the plaintiff had adequately stated a cause of
action for emotional injury, 158 the court proclaimed that "[i]f
such misinformation is erroneously communicated to the patient
153. Ferrara,5 N.Y.2d at 21, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 9991000. The court addressed the fact that cases involving purely emotional
injuries have the implicit danger of being false claims, but strongly concluded

that this truism should not impede courts from looking to the facts of each case
to come to decisions based on medical and other acceptable and genuine forms
of proof. Id.
154. Id. at 22, 152 N.E.2d at 252, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
155. See John Patrick Darby, Note, Tort Liability for the Transmission of
the AIDS Virus: Damages for the Fear of AIDS and Prospective AIDS, 45
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 192 (1988) ("Just as a reasonable and genuine

fear of cancer constitutes a present injury, a reasonable and genuine fear of
AIDS is a present injury, even though development of AIDS is speculative."
(relying on Hagerty v. L & L Marine Serv., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir.
1986))).
156. 137 Misc. 2d 980, 523 N.Y.S.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1987).
157. Id. at 980-81, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
158. Id. at 987, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 347.
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through negligence a cognizable cause of action exists." 15 9 However, the plaintiff still must show that her fear of cancer is reasonable in order to recover. 16 0
Similarly, then, one would probably state a cognizable cause of
action if a physician misdiagnosed a patient with IV or AIDS,
based on the reasoning in Martell. Certainly, being negligently
diagnosed with a disease which is fatal would ultimately end in
emotional injury with which an action can be commenced.
Another type of disease phobia is asbestos phobia, or the fear
of cancer resulting from exposure to asbestos fibers. This issue
1
was dealt with in Gerardi v. Nuclear Utility Services, Inc. 16 In
Gerardi, the plaintiffs worked on a maintenance project which
included "the dismantling of pipework and the removal and replacement of pipe gaskets." 162 The materials the plaintiffs used
were mainly composed of asbestos. 163 While the plaintiffs
worked, a large cloud of dust containing asbestos, which the
workers presumably inhaled, formed around the work site. 164
Although the plaintiffs conceded that, at the present time, they
were not infected by the disease, 165 the court held that "[i]n circumstances where a duty is owed by a defendant to plaintiff,

159. Id
160. See Winik v. Jewish Hosp. of Brooklyn, 31 N.Y.2d 936, 293 N.E.2d
95, 340 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1972). Although a cause of action existed, the Winik
court held that the appellant was unable to show that her fear of contracting
cancer was reasonable. Id.at 937, 293 N.E.2d at 95, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
The Martell court distinguished Winik by stating that although the plaintiff in
Winik failed to meet her burden of proving that her fear of cancer was
reasonable, this would not automatically preclude other claimants from
pursuing a claim. Martell, 137 Misc. 2d at 987, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 347; cf.
Kraus v. Spielberg, 37 Misc. 2d 519, 236 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1962) (directed verdict granted to defendant when plaintiff alleged
tuberculosis phobia due to defendant's misdiagnosis since defendant's
professional opinion of tuberculosis was medically warranted).
161. 149 Misc. 2d 657, 566 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1991).
162. Id. at 658, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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breach of that duty resulting directly in emotional harm is compensable even though no physical injury has occurred .... ,166
Asbestos phobia was also dealt with in Rittenhouse v. St. Regis
Hotel Joint Venture. 167 In Rittenhouse, the court held that exposure to asbestos alone was not sufficient to sustain a cause of action since asbestos removal projects were universal, and thus,
"[a] reasonable person, exercising due diligence, should know
that of those exposed to asbestos, only a small percentage suffer
from asbestos-related physical impairment, and of that impairment group fewer still develop [recognizable diseases]." 168
Although the decisions in Gerardi and Rittenhouse seem inconsistent, reliance on either decision will support a viable cause of
action for the fear of contracting AIDS. On the one hand, Gerardi held that as long as there is a breach of a duty which directly
results in emotional harm, a cause of action for asbestos phobia
will be upheld. 169 Similarly, then, AIDS phobia would be supported based simply on the existence of the requisite elements of
the tort. On the other hand, Rittenhouse held that, without medical evidence to support the plaintiff's anxiety, fear of contracting
cancer from asbestos fibers was unreasonable. 170 However, in
contrast to asbestos phobia, a person exposed to HIV would have

166. Id. at 660, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 1004-05 (relying on Kennedy v.
McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1983)
and Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Medical Ctr., 70 N.Y.2d 697,
512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987)).
167. 149 Misc. 2d 452, 565 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1990). The plaintiff, an interior decorator, sued the defendant for mental
anguish caused by an alleged exposure to asbestos containing material which
she was purportedly exposed to during a furniture liquidation sale at the
defendant's hotel. Id. at 453, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 366. In light of the fact that all
objective testing of plaintiff failed to demonstrate a physical manifestation of
an asbestos related condition, the court held that the defendant's motion for
summary judgment should be granted. Id. at 455-56, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 367-68.
168. Id. at 455, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 367 (quoting In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos
Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (D. Haw. 1990)).
169. See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
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a reasonable fear. 17 1 While the Rittenhouse court ruled that a reasonable person would not have a genuine fear of contracting an
asbestos-related disease due to the widespread removal of asbestos and the unlikelihood of developing this type of disease, 172
based on this same reasoning, a reasonable person would have a
genuine fear of contracting AIDS if possibly exposed to the virus.
Unlike asbestos removal, presently there is no cure for HIV, and
its resultant, AIDS. 173 Since AIDS is a relatively new disease, 17 4
there is more that needs to be learned, 175 and hence, the absence
of knowledge helps to substantiate a fear. Although it is necessary to show more than mere exposure to HIV, it is considered a
more reasonable fear than simply being exposed to asbestos fibers.
C. Future Scenarios
In the future, in all likelihood, other scenarios will arise where
the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress for AIDS
phobia will appear. Thus far, the tort has appeared in situations
dealing with failure to reveal homosexuality, 176 a claimant being
bitten, 177 an employee being stuck by a discarded needle, 17 8 and

171. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text (discussing facts about
HIV infection, its relation to AIDS, and its current status as an incurable and
fatal condition).

172. Rinenhouse, 149 Misc. 2d at 455, 565 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
173. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text (discussing the current
state of medical technology in addressing HIV infection and AIDS).
174. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT supra note 4, at 1 (stating that the
first cases of AIDS were reported in 1981).

175. See Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 153 Misc. 2d 1, 6, 588
N.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1991) ("Mhe AIDS disease

is still not completely understood by the medical profession .... ").
176. See Doe v. Doe, 136 Misc. 2d 1015, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1987) (plaintiff-wife sought damages for AIDS phobia based on
defendant-husband's failure to reveal his homosexuality).
177. See Hare v. State, 143 Misc. 2d 281, 539 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Ct. Cl.
1989) (plaintiff was bitten on arm by inmate rumored to have AIDS and
subsequently developed an oppressive fear of contracting AIDS), aff'd, 173
A.D.2d 523, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (2d Dep't 1991).
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a doctor performing surgery on a patient with AIDS. 17 9 Although
no New York cases have been reported, it is possible that the tort
may appear in the situation of sexual partners where one partner
fails to disclose either his or her HIV-positive status or that he or
she has AIDS. The following discussion goes through this analysis.
Take the hypothetical situation of a man and a woman who met
at a bar. They decided, after talking for an hour or two, to leave
the bar and go to one of their apartments, and as mature adults
chose to engage in sexual intercourse. The man had recently been
tested for HIV, which revealed his HIV-positive status. Before
engaging in sexual intercourse with the woman, he neglected to
tell her that he is HIV-positive. Additionally, during intercourse,
there was no use of a contraceptive device, such as a condom, to
help prevent the spread of a sexually transmitted disease. One
week later, the man, overridden with guilt because of his failure
to reveal to his sexual partner that he had tested positive for HIV,
called her and told her that he is infected with the virus.
The woman, fearing that she may herself be infected with HIV,
decided to take legal action and sued the man for fear of contracting AIDS based on the tort of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Based on the aforementioned discussion, it appears that
the plaintiff-woman would have a viable cause of action. In the
analysis of the Hare and the Castro cases, it was concluded that
when the contamination source is unknown, a fear of AIDS is
considered genuine, and if the contamination source is known,
there needs to be direct evidence that the contaminated source has
AIDS or is HIV-positive. In the situation at hand, the source of
the contamination is known and there is evidence that the defendant has AIDS or is HIV-positive. He explicitly called the plaintiff and revealed that he had tested positive for HIV.
178. See Castro, 153 Misc. 2d 1, 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (plaintiff sustained
hypodermic needle puncture to the right thumb and possible HIV infection
from a discarded needle and consequently alleged fear of contracting AIDS).
179. See Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 154 Misc. 2d 269, 583 N.Y.S.2d
1014 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1992) (plaintiff-doctor feared contracting AIDS
when he was not informed until after performing surgery that patient was HIVpositive).
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Additionally, from the discussion of Ordway, the cause of action would probably be sustained. In Ordway, it was determined
that, while negligent infliction of emotional distress does not require a physical impact or a consequential physical manifestation,
in order to prove a fear of contracting AIDS, a plaintiff must be
physically exposed to the virus in one of the ways it is transmitted. Here, it is evident that the plaintiff was physically exposed to
the virus since she engaged in sexual intercourse with the defendant.
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant breached a duty owed
to the plaintiff by his failure to disclose his HIV-positive status,
and the breach directly caused the plaintiff's emotional harm,
then the plaintiff should be able to sustain a cause of action. The
analysis in this situation, however, does not end here. The defendant in this situation may have defenses. Simply stated, he may
defend his actions by showing that the plaintiff assumed the risk
of her behavior or was contributorily or comparatively negligent. 180

In arguing an assumption of the risk defense, two requirements
must be met. 181 "[F]irst, the plaintiff must know that the risk is
present, and [s]he must further understand its nature; and second,
h[er] choice to incur it must be free and voluntary."182 In the
scenario depicted, these two elements are present. The court reasoned in Castro that, based on the enormous information given
today regarding AIDS, a person stuck by a discarded needle
could develop a fear of AIDS. Likewise, a reasonable person
should be expected to know, based on the information about
AIDS, that a substantial risk of contracting AIDS exists upon engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse with a stranger. Thus, it
is more than likely, and even self-evident, that the plaintiff knew
that a risk of contracting AIDS was present upon engaging in
sexual intercourse with the defendant. Additionally, the plaintiff
made the free and conscious choice to engage in sexual inter180. See KEEToN

Er AL.,

supra note 24, §§ 65, 67 and 68, at 451-62, 468-

98.
181. Id. § 68, at 486-87.
182. Id. at 487.
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course with the defendant, and therefore, voluntarily made the
choice to incur the risk of contracting AIDS. Hence, the plaintiff
would be barred from recovery if the defendant could prove that
the plaintiff assumed the risk.
Additionally, the defendant in this scenario might be able to
show that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
"Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff,
contributing as a legal cause to the harm [s]he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which [s]he is required to conform for h[er] own protection."183 Additionally, "contributory
negligence, in general, is determined and governed by the same
tests and rules as the negligence of the defendant., 184
Thus, the plaintiff had a duty to protect herself from diseases
such as AIDS. She breached this duty by not insisting that the
defendant wear a condom, by not abstaining from sexual intercourse, or by not asking the defendant whether he was infected
with HIV or AIDS. Finally, it could be found that her resulting
fear of contracting AIDS was a direct result of her own breach.
Therefore, if the defendant can prove that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, then that will serve as a complete bar to recovery in jurisdictions which continue to treat contributory negligence as an absolute bar.
Since this Comment deals specifically with the law in New
York, the doctrine of pure comparative negligence comes into
play. This doctrine states that "a plaintiff's contributory
negligence does not operate to bar h[er] recovery altogether, but
does serve to reduce h[er] damages in proportion to h[er]
fault." 185 Thus, while the plaintiff may have breached a duty to
herself by failing to demand the use of a condom, abstaining
from sexual intercourse, or asking the defendant about his HIVpositive status, her breach will not create an absolute bar to
recovery, but it will serve to lessen her recovery by an amount
the jury deems her to be at fault.

183. Id. § 65, at 451.
184. Id. at 453.
185. Id. § 67, at 472.
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Notwithstanding other possible causes of action, this scenario is
one of many that could possibly arise. The model depicted is necessarily one based on the facts. Whether a plaintiff will have a
cause of action for AIDS phobia depends on her actions as well
as the defendants.
CONCLUSION

Clearly, negligent infliction of emotional distress for the fear of
contracting AIDS is a viable cause of action. The New York
Court of Appeals would sustain such an action based on its general acceptance of recovery for emotional harm. The court of appeals currently requires a breached duty which directly causes the
plaintiff's emotional harm. 186 Additionally, the court would require a guarantee of genuineness to show that the emotional harm
is actually being suffered. 187 While a physician's documented
evidence, together with the wide spread media coverage, would
usually be enough to guarantee the genuineness of fear, a cause
of action for the fear of contracting AIDS would require an additional element. That is, the plaintiff must also show that he or she
was actually exposed to contracting HIV in one of the specific
ways in which the virus can be transmitted. 188 Furthermore, it is
likely that the negligent infliction of emotional distress for the
fear of contracting AIDS is a viable cause of action that the court
of appeals would uphold based not only on the elements, but also
on analogous disease-phobia cases. Finally, since AIDS is a relatively new disease and there is not yet a cure, there will certainly
be other situations in which the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress for the fear of contracting AIDS will
arise.
HarrisJ. Zakarin
186. See supra notes 24-29, 65-66 and accompanying text (citing New York

Court of Appeals decisions which provide for duty, breach, and direct cause).
187. See supra notes 30, 55, 63 and accompanying text (stating that a
guarantee of genuineness is needed to substantiate a claim of negligent

infliction of emotional distress).
188. See supra note 4 (discussing the ways in which HIV can be

transmitted).
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